Abstract. Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) offers a logical framework to prevent a user of a database from inadvertently gaining knowledge he is not allowed to know. By modeling the user's a priori knowledge in an appropriate way, a CQE system can control not only plain access to database entries but also inferences made by the user. A dynamic CQE system that enforces inference control at runtime has already been investigated. In this article, we pursue a static approach that constructs an inference-proof database in a preprocessing step. The inference-proof database can respond to any query without enabling the user to infer confidential information. We illustrate the semantics of the system by a comprehensive example and state the essential requirements for an inference-proof and highly available database. We present an algorithm that accomplishes the preprocessing by combining SAT solving and "Branch and Bound".
Introduction and Related Work
Controlled query evaluation (cf. [1] [2] [3] ) aims at preserving the confidentiality of some secret information in a sequence of queries to a database. Not only plain access to certain database entries is denied but also information that can be gained by logical reasoning is taken into consideration. This is what is usually called inference control. There are a lot of different approaches addressing inference control for example for statistical databases [9] , distributed databases [5] , relational databases with fuzzy values [15] and for XML documents [19] . In [11] the authors give a comprehensive overview of existing inference control techniques and state some of the fundamental problems in this area. Wang et al. [18] name two typical protection mechanisms (in their case for online analytical processing (OLAP) systems): restriction (deleting some values in the query result) and perturbation (changing some values in the query result). In general, any method for avoiding inferences has an effect on the accuracy of the returned answers. Hence, there is a trade-off between confidentiality of secret information and availability of information; in order to protect the secret information, some (even non-secret) information may be modified. Reliability may also be reduced by protection mechanisms; the user may be unsure of whether he got a correct or a modified answer. The above mentioned approaches are typically based on specialized data structures (relational data model, XML documents); Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) however offers a flexible framework to execute inference control based on an arbitrary logic. In this paper, we construct an inference-proof database in the CQE framework considering the original database, a user's a priori knowledge and a set of secrets. In Section 2 we introduce the CQE framework and state the prerequisites assumed in this paper. In Section 3 we formalize the notion of an inference-proof and highly available database. Section 4 shows a transformation of our problem to SAT solving and presents an algorithm that computes an inference-proof database. A comprehensive example illustrates our approach in Subsections 2.1 and 4.3.
Controlled Query Evaluation
Basically, a system model for Controlled Query Evaluation consists of:
1. a database that contains some freely accessible information and some secret information 2. a single user (or a group of collaborating users, respectively) having a certain amount of information as a priori knowledge of the database and the world in general; the case that several different users independently query the database is not considered as the database cannot distinguish whether a group of users collaborates or not
The user sends queries to the database and the database sends corresponding answers to the user. To prevent the user from inferring confidential information from the answers and his assumed a priori knowledge, appropriate restriction or perturbation is done by the CQE system on the database side. In CQE on the one hand refusal is used as a means of restriction: to a critical query the database refuses to answer (i.e., just returns mum). On the other hand, lying is employed as a means of perturbation: the database returns a false value or declares the query answer as undefined although a value exists in the database. In this way, the CQE approach automates the enforcement of confidentiality: wanting to restrict access to some secret information, a database administrator just specifies which information has to be kept secret; then, the CQE system computes the inferenceproof answers. No human being ever has to consider inferences potentially made by the user, because the CQE system computes these inferences and employs the above mentioned protection mechanisms such that only "safe" answers are returned to the user. However, the database should be as cooperative as possible: only a minimum of answers should be distorted to ensure the confidentiality of the secret information. CQE can be varied based on several different parameters:
-complete information systems are considered with a model-theoretic approach (see [2] ) while incomplete information systems are treated with a proof-theoretic approach (see [4] ) -the secret information can be represented by two distinct types of "confidentiality policies": either secrecies (no truth value may be known by the userbe it true or false) or potential secrets (the user may know that a secret is false or possibly undefined, but the user may not know that a secret is true) -the user may or may not know what kind of information is to be kept secret; therefore the "user awareness" can be divided into the known policy and the unknown policy case -as the protection mechanism (also called "enforcement method") either lying or refusal or a combination of both can be employed (see [3] )
In this paper we focus on a complete information system in propositional logic with a security policy of potential secrets and a known policy. Additionally, we only use lying as a protection mechanism. Thus, in this paper a CQE system is based on the following:
-a finite alphabet P of propositional variables; formulas can be built from the variables with the connectives ¬, ∨ and ∧; 1 formulas contain "positive literals" (variables) and "negative literals" (negations of variables) -a database db ⊂ P that represents an interpretation I of the propositional variables: for each A ∈ P, if A ∈ db, then I assigns A the value true (written as I(A) = 1), else I assigns A the value false (written as I(A) = 0); this means that we have a complete database: to each query the database returns either true or false -the user's queries to the database as formulas Φ over P -a security policy pot sec as a set of formulas over P of "potential secrets"; these potential secrets represent the secret information; the semantics is that for each formula Ψ ∈ pot sec, if Ψ evaluates to true according to db then the user may not know this, but the user may believe that the formula evaluates to false (that is, the negation of Ψ evaluates to true according to db). -the user's a priori knowledge as a set of formulas over P called prior ; prior may contain general knowledge (like implications over P) or knowledge of db (like semantic constraints)
There are some prerequisites our system has to fulfill. In this paper, we presume that: prior |= pot sec disj (where pot sec disj :=
We require (d) because if the user already knows a potential secret, we obviously cannot protect the secret anymore. Moreover, in the case of lying as the only protection mechanism, we even have to be more strict: requirement (e) is necessary, because otherwise the system could run into a situation where even a lie reveals a secret. To illustrate this, assume pot sec = {α, β} (for formulas α and β that are both true according to db) and prior = {α ∨ β}; to the query Φ = α the CQE system would return the lie ¬α, but this would enable the user to conclude that β were true (and he is not allowed to know this); thus, we require prior to fulfill Equation (1). This line of reasoning also demands that the CQE system lie to every query entailing the disjunction of some potential secrets. See [1, 3] for more information.
An Example System
The following example shall clarify the system design. Let us imagine that we have a database with Alice's medical records. The curious user Mallory wants to find out whether she is incapable of working or has financial problems. We use the alphabet P = {cancer, brokenArm, brokenLeg, highCosts, lowWorkCpcty}.
Poor Alice is badly ill and her medical records (as a set of literals) look like this:
It is generally known that cancer leads to high medical costs and low work capacity and that a broken arm leads to low work capacity and a broken leg to high medical costs. Expressing these implications as formulas, we have the general knowledge genknowl = { ¬cancer ∨ highCosts, ¬cancer ∨ lowWorkCpcty, ¬brokenArm ∨ lowWorkCpcty, ¬brokenLeg ∨ highCosts}.
The database db contains the medical record record and is compliant with the general knowledge genknowl; thus, in this example we have
Mallory just knows what is also generally known:
Now we can specify the potential secrets. As a first example we have just one formula consisting of one literal:
To the query Φ = cancer the database should now return the lie false (as otherwise Mallory would conclude from his a priori knowledge that Alice has low work capacity). The same applies to the queries brokenArm and lowWorkCpcty. However, to the queries brokenLeg and highCosts the database should return the correct answer true. A conjunction of two literals means that Mallory may know one of the literals but may not know both at the same time. As an example, consider the secret pot sec 2 = {highCosts ∧ lowWorkCpcty}.
To one of the queries Φ 1 = brokenArm and Φ 2 = brokenLeg the database can return the correct answer true; however, to the other query the database has to return the lie false (otherwise both high medical costs and low work capacity can be concluded). The meaning of a disjunction of two literals implies that Mallory may know neither of the literals. Consider pot sec 3 = {highCosts ∨ lowWorkCpcty}.
To every possible atomic query Φ ∈ P the database has to return the lie false (as otherwise either high medical costs or low work capacity or both can be concluded). The intended semantics of pot sec can inductively be extended to non-singleton sets of arbitrary formulas.
As can be seen from the above examples, confidentiality of secret information is considered more important than a correct and reliable answer. Secret information has to be kept secret even at the risk of returning inaccurate information.
Constructing an Inference-Proof Database
Given a database db, a security policy pot sec in the form of potential secrets, and the user's a priori knowledge prior as described in the previous section, we now want to construct a database db that is inference-proof with respect to every possible sequence of queries the user may come up with. We demand the following for db to be fulfilled:
i. [inference-proof ] db does not satisfy any of the potential secrets: db |= Ψ for every Ψ ∈ pot sec ii.
[complete] db is complete (as is db) iii. [highly available] db contains as few lies as possible; we want to remove, add or change only a minimum of entries (with respect to the original database db): db shall contain a lie only if otherwise a potential secret would be endangered iv.
[consistent] db is consistent in itself and also consistent with prior as the user's a priori knowledge is fixed and we cannot make the user believe inconsistent information
As for the inference-proofness and completeness features (i. and ii.), we want db to represent an interpretation I that assigns a value to every propositional variable in P. Hence the database db must return an answer (true or false) to every query -also to a query containing a potential secret. As we consider here the known policy case, the user knows that he gets the answer false when querying a potential secret (because he is not allowed to know that a potential secret is true). So concluding from completeness and the user's awareness of the security policy, as one property of the database db we have:
We define the set of formulas Neg(pot sec) := {¬Ψ |Ψ ∈ pot sec} and try to find an interpretation I that satisfies all formulas in Neg(pot sec) in order for db to fulfill (2) . Now, let us turn to the availability feature (iii.). 2 To have a measure for the availability of db we define a distance between an interpretation I and an interpretation J with respect to a set of propositional variables V as follows: dist V (I, J) := ||{A|A ∈ V, I(A) = J(A)}||. That is, we count all variables in V having in one interpretation a value distinct from the value in the other interpretation. As we want to maximize availability, we have to minimize the distance of the new interpretation I with respect to the original interpretation I and all variables in P: dist P (I, I ) −→ min.
The consistency feature (iv.) means that we want to find an interpretation I such that all formulas in prior are satisfied.
All in all we conclude that I has to be an interpretation (for the variables in P) that has minimal distance to the original interpretation I and satisfies the set of formulas prior ∪ Neg(pot sec). Under the requirements (a)-(e) given in Section 2, such a satisfying interpretation always exists. To prove this, first of all note that requirement (e) implies that pot sec disj is not a tautology. Combining requirements (a) and (e), we conclude that prior is consistent with the set Neg(pot sec). Thus, there exists at least one interpretation I satisfying prior ∪ Neg(pot sec).
A "Branch and Bound"-SAT-solver
In order to find interpretation I , we combine SAT-solving (for the completeness and satisfiability requirements) with "Branch and Bound" (for the minimization requirement). The database db representing I will be inference-proof by construction, as we describe in the following.
SAT-solvers try to find a satisfying interpretation for a set of clauses (i.e. disjunctions of literals). The basis for nearly all non-probabilistic SAT-solvers is the so-called DLL-algorithm (see [7, 6] ). It implements:
1. "elimination of one-literal clauses" (also called "boolean constraint propagation", BCP): a unit clause (i.e., a clause consisting of just one literal) must be evaluated to true 2. "affirmative-negative rule": if in all clauses only the positive literal or only the negative literal of a variable occurs (a so-called "pure literal"), then the literal can be evaluated to true 3. splitting on variables: take one yet uninterpreted variable, set it to false (to get one subproblem) and to true (to get a second subproblem), and try to find a solution for at least one of the subproblems Whenever a value is assigned to a variable, the set of clauses can be simplified by subsumption (if a clause contains a literal that is evaluated to true, remove the whole clause) or resolution (if a clause contains a literal that is evaluated to false, remove this literal from the clause but keep the remaining clause). "Branch and Bound" (B&B, for short) is a method for finding solutions to an optimization problem. It offers the features "branching" (dividing the problem into adequate subproblems), "bounding" (efficiently computing local lower and upper bounds for subproblems), and "pruning" (discarding a subproblem due to a bad bound value). For a minimization problem a global upper bound is maintained stating the currently best value. A B&B-algorithm may have a superpolynomial running time; however, execution may be stopped with the assurance that the optimal solution's value is in between the global upper bound and the minimum of the local lower bounds.
The Algorithm
First of all, we consider the case where prior ∪Neg(pot sec) is a set of formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF); the general case will be treated in Section 4.2. We define the set of clauses C decision as
where clauses(Ψ ) is a set of clauses representing Ψ ∈ prior ∪ Neg(pot sec). C decision is the input to our SAT-solving algorithm. Let P decision ⊂ P be the set of all variables occurring in C decision ; these are the "decision variables". Our SATsolver finds an interpretation I decision for all decision variables; all other variables get assigned the same truth value as before: I (A) := I(A) if A ∈ P \ P decision . Thus, we have dist P\P decision (I, I ) = 0. We find an interpretation I decision for P decision satisfying C decision with minimal distance to I by employing a branch and bound algorithm. Listings 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the four functions "initialization", "best-first-search splitting", "boolean constraint propagation", and "simplification of clauses" of our algorithm. In the following we describe each function in detail. B&B on the set P decision yields a binary tree; its maximal depth is the cardinality of P decision : depth max = ||P decision ||. The binary structure of the tree is created as follows. In every node v a "splitting variable" A ∈ P decision is selected; we refer to this variable by splitvar (v). Then, a left and a right child node v lef t and v right are constructed; in one of the child nodes A is set to true and in the other child node A is set to false. This is the splitting step of the DLL-algorithm as well as the branching step of B&B. We conduct a "best-first search" with our B&B algorithm: in the left child node we assign splitvar (v) the same truth value as in I (this choice yields better local bounds and we process the left child node first; see Listing 2, line 2.3.), and in the right child node we assign splitvar (v) the opposite truth value I(splitvar (v)) (which yields worse local bounds; see line 2.6.). A splitting step is pictured in Figure 1 . Each node v has its own set of clauses C v . The child nodes get each a simplified set of clauses constructed from C v by subsumption and resolution (see lines 2.5.1. and 2.8.1. and Listing 4). Initially, for the root node r the set of clauses is C r = C decision (see Listing 1, line 1.3.). Before splitting takes place in node v, we carry out BCP: unit clauses are repeatedly eliminated from C v until there are none left (see Listing 3, line 3.2.). Variables in unit clauses are assigned a value without splitting on these variables; thus, BCP reduces the number of branches in the tree. Each node v represents an interpretation I v containing all variable assignments occurring on the path from the root node r to the node v. Initially, for the root node r all values are undefined (see Listing 1, line 1.1.). In each node v also the local lower bound lb v and the local upper bound ub v are defined. The global upper bound is called ub global . We compute the bounds using the availability distance defined above; this is the bounding step of B&B. The lower bound lb v is the number of variables that are assigned in I v a value distinct from the value in the original interpretation I; the upper bound ub v is lb v plus the number of variables that are still undefined in I v ; if the final interpretation I decision can be found in this branch, it has at least distance lb v and at most distance ub v from I: lb v ≤ dist P decision (I, I decision ) ≤ ub v . Initially, the bounds are lb r = 0 and ub r = depth max ; ub global is initialized to depth max , too (see line 1.2.). During BCP the bounds are accordingly adjusted (see lines 3.2.1.2. and 3.2.1.3.). After BCP in the root node r, the global upper bound can already be decre- mented (see line 3.3.); every satisfying assignment I decision has to satisfy the unit clauses in the root node. Subsequently, ub global may only be adjusted when a complete and satisfying interpretation I v is found and ub v < ub global (see line 4.3.). During splitting in an arbitrary node v, in the left child node only the upper bound has to be decremented, while in the right child node only the lower bound has to be incremented (see lines 2.3. and 2.6.). For the pruning of B&B to take place, there are two possible conditions:
SPLIT(Iv
1. [bad lower bound] the local lower bound of node v is worse than the current global upper bound: lb v > ub global ; we have already found a better solution and we are not able to expand I v to an interpretation for all decision variables with minimal distance 2.
[unsatisfiability] while constructing I v we encountered an inconsistency:
we are not able to expand I v to an interpretation for all decision variables that satisfies C decision
The lower bound condition is checked in lines 2.4., 2.7. and 3.2.2. after new lower bounds have been calculated. The unsatisfiability condition is checked in line 4.2.2. during simplification: if an empty clause is generated, the current interpretation is not satisfying.
In the subsumption step it may happen that variables "disappear" from the clauses: there are no clauses left that contain the variables. Thus, it may be the case that in the final interpretation I decision there are still some undefined variables (they are often referred to as "don't care variables"). However, these variables had no influence on the satisfiability of the clauses; these variables are removed from P decision and thus are assigned the same truth value as in the original interpretation.
Having found I decision satisfying C decision and having minimal distance to I, we can construct our inference-proof database db as follows:
for all A ∈ P decision :
A ∈ db iff I decision (A) = 1 for all A ∈ P \ P decision : A ∈ db iff A ∈ db (that is I(A) = 1)
If ||P decision || ||P||, it may be more efficient to just maintain a small separate database db decision , in this special case including possibly negated entries:
for all A ∈ P decision A ∈ db decision iff I decision (A) = 1 ¬A ∈ db decision iff I decision (A) = 0 db decision returns the truth values for all variables from P decision . The original database db returns the truth values of variables from P \ P decision .
Some Remarks on Further Techniques
There exist several adaptations of the basic DLL-algorithm to non-CNF formulas. For example, Ganai et al. [13] introduce hybrid SAT for boolean circuits where only newly added ("learned") clauses are in CNF. Propagation in circuits is supported by a lookup table and "watched literals" (see also [21] ). Giunchiglia et al. [14] apply renaming of subformulas by adding new variables (thus constructing an equisatisfiable formula in CNF for a non-CNF input formula) but propose to split only on the original ("independent") variables. Thiffault et al. [17] represent the non-CNF input formula as a directed acyclic graph and base propagation on "watch children" and "don't care watch parents". With such techniques our B&B-algorithm can be extended to accept non-CNF formulas. Moreover, a vast number of optimization techniques and splitting heuristics have been proposed for the basic DLL-algorithm; for example, subsumption removal [20] , reduction of the number of clauses [10] or elimination of variables [16] . Such techniques can be employed to speed up the search process. Our availability distance may not be the only optimization criterion; the bounding can easily be extended by other measures to guide the search and determine the quality of a solution. Equally, a preference relation on propositions can be employed so that lying for a lower-ranked proposition is preferred to lying for a higher-ranked proposition.
Lastly, let us note that in our algorithm pure literals cannot be removed, that is, the DLL-"affirmative-negative rule" cannot be applied: setting pure literals to true may lead to an interpretation that does not have minimal distance. Anyway, detection of pure literals is expensive (see for example [21] ) and often omitted in SAT-solver implementations.
An Example Run
Let us come back to our example. We consider db, prior and pot sec 1 . The set prior ∪Neg(pot sec 1 ) is a set of CNF-formulas and we have as a set of clauses (clauses are written with square brackets): Figure 2 shows the tree created by our algorithm. We need just one splitting step; all other assignments are determined by BCP. }. This yields the interpretation I r (cancer) = I r (brokenArm) = I r (lowWorkCpcty) = 0 and from this we compute the bounds lb r = 3 and ub global = ub r = 5. Next we split on splitvar (r) = brokenLeg: we construct the child nodes r lef t and r right and begin with I r lef t (brokenLeg) = 1 (best-first search). We have lb r lef t = 3 and ub r lef t = 4 and simplification produces the new unit clause [highCosts] . BCP on this clause results in lb r lef t = 3 and ub r lef t = 3; we have found a complete and satisfying interpretation in this branch and we set ub global = ub r lef t = 3. We now treat r right and set I r right (brokenLeg) = 0, lb r right = 4 and ub r right = 5. We find that lb r right > ub global and this branch is pruned. Thus, the optimal solution is I (brokenLeg) = I (highCosts) = 1 on the one hand and I (cancer) = I (brokenArm) = I (lowWorkCpcty) = 0 on the other hand; the transformed database is db = {brokenLeg, highCosts} with distance 3 to the original database.
Conclusion and Future Work
We presented an algorithm to preprocess an inference-proof database based on a user's a priori knowledge and a specification of secret information. While the worst-case runtime is exponential, there is a good chance to find an acceptable (or even optimal) solution in a smaller amount of time. Even if we stop the algorithm prematurely and accept a suboptimal solution, it is a solution that is definitely inference-proof; it might only be suboptimal with respect to availability: there may be more lies in the database than necessary.
Future work shall investigate how this approach can be adapted to other CQE parameters, namely, the unknown policy case, refusal as a restriction method and incomplete databases. Furthermore, this method shall be expanded to other logics (for example first-order logic). In a wider setting, we want to connect CQE to other established research areas, for example linear or constraint programming [12] and theory merging [8] . Moreover, a comparison of the CQE system to existing approaches for general purpose databases (see e.g. [11] ) has already been initiated.
One of the fundamental problems inherent to every inference control system still remains: It is difficult -if not impossible -to appropriately model the user's knowledge in the system. Apart from that, there are other interesting questions regarding the user's knowledge in the approach presented here. For example, if there is one transformed database db 1 for a fixed prior 1 , is it possible to reuse (parts of) db 1 to construct a db 2 for a different prior 2 ? Similarly, if we allow the user's knowledge to change at runtime due to input from external sources, is it possible to adjust db to the new situation? These topics will be covered in the near future.
